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Abstract: Coal was crucial to the growth of several South American states between 
1850 and 1913, being used for their expanding railway networks, to generate power 
for their emerging industries, and by the steamships in which much of their overseas 
trade was conducted. Lacking indigenous sources of sufficiently high quality, 
Argentina and Brazil in particular came to rely heavily on Welsh coal for their energy 
needs. While playing a crucial role in the economic development of such countries, 
Welsh coal and its distribution network of coaling stations also helped in protecting 
the trade between Britain and South America, allowing the Royal Navy to have access 
to the most suitable coal for its purposes at distances varying from almost 4,000 to 
10,000 miles from its point of origin. This paper explores various aspects of the 
development of this trade and argues that, in discussions of the development of the 
informal empire, the significance of (Welsh) coal should not be overlooked, as has 
tended to be the case in some modern works. 
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Many different ideas have been developed by historians to try to reflect the nature of 
the relationship existing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries between Britain and 
Latin American countries. Foremost amongst these is that of ‘informal empire,’ an 
idea initially developed in John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s seminal publication, 
The Imperialism of Free Trade, and which suggested that Latin America countries, 
while not under British rule and therefore not part of the formal British Empire, 
provided a prime example of imperial dominion through British economic power. 
This idea was expanded upon by Cain and Hopkins who famously advocated the 
importance of free trade and the informal empire to Britain in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, predicated on the fact that business interests were often closely 
intertwined with political ones.
1
 Cain and Hopkins’ concept of ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ drew specific attention to the role of finance and services such as shipping 
and insurance.
2
 Subsequent work on South American states has reinforced the view 
that British influence was fundamental to their development in the nineteenth 
century.
3
  
Nevertheless, the relevance of the term informal empire to describe this 
relationship has often been challenged since, not least with respect to key countries in 
South America. Winn, for example, notes that Britain’s desire for a level playing field 
with respect to free trade represented a “self-serving piety,” since she knew that 
Britain would be the only real beneficiary, while Simpson recognises the importance 
of free trade in creating “a framework in which self help and private initiative could 
flourish.” 4 Despite their agreement over the importance of free trade, while Winn 
considers that the experience of Uruguay fits the Gallagher-Robinson informal empire 
model, Simpson argues that, in Argentina, there is no evidence of “any systematic 
policy of informal rule” exercised by the British government.5  
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 While free trade can result in mutual benefits, as Lewis has pointed out, the 
gains need not be shared equally between the participants.
6
 Nevertheless, he notes that 
the benefits of British investment in Argentinian railways in the late nineteenth 
century accrued to both the London-based railway companies and the local political 
elites. Pointing out that this investment does not fit the hegemonic/satellite, 
Gallagher-Robinson or dependency models, Lewis argues that, broadly speaking, the 
foreign railway companies “delivered what was expected of them in terms of state-
building, frontier-expansion, market-integration and nation-building, and the 
valorisation of local assets.”7 As in other countries, the Argentinian railways played 
an important role in shaping the nature and the extent of internal economic 
development through reducing internal transport costs. Using data on Argentina, 
Fajgelbaum and Redding have identified the significance of complementary internal 
investments in mediating the response of an economy to external integration into 
world markets in the late nineteenth century.
8
 Pascali, however, has pointed out that 
the reductions in trade barriers resulting from moves towards free trade do not 
automatically generate large positive effects on economic development.
9
 While noting 
that the development of the steam engine for marine propulsion accounts for about 
half of the growth in world trade in the second half of the nineteenth century, Pascali 
points to the important influence of institutions on urbanization rates and population 
density: trade had greater positive effects in those countries with inclusive institutions, 
in contrast to those with autocratic regimes.
10
 
 In recent years, the historical process of globalisation has attracted the 
attention of economic geographers, who have stressed the significance of trade 
networks for economic development.
11
 Recent research into informal empire has 
likewise looked towards networks, questioning “how the existence and unity of 
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empires were made possible by supranational connections, and how empires fostered 
networks that cut across national boundaries.”12 By combining the historical and 
geographical approaches, this paper examines one specific network which was 
fundamental to the relationship between Britain and South America between the 
middle of the nineteenth century and the First World War: the export of Welsh coal. 
 
Economic relations between Britain and South America, 1850–1913 
Analysing developments between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1920s, Bulmer-
Thomas concluded that there was a “‘natural’ complementarity between the world’s 
greatest imperial power [Britain] and a region [Latin America] blessed with a capacity 
to produce cheap raw materials and foodstuffs.”13 A combination of factors, including 
Britain’s adoption of free trade, the growing commitment of Latin American countries 
to export-led growth, the willingness of capital to once again flow into Latin America, 
and, to a much lesser extent, the migration of British labour, all played a role in this 
process. While “British pre-eminence in foreign investment in Latin America was not 
[…] seriously challenged before the First World War,”14 its overall hegemony in 
Latin America began to wane from around 1870. This was reflected in its falling 
market share in the region, and one which “would have been more serious if Britain 
had not succeeded in keeping a strong grip on the Argentine market – by far the most 
important Latin American economy in terms of foreign trade by the end of the 
century.”15  
 The share of British exports accounted for by Latin America grew between 
1860 and 1913 from 7.0 percent to 11.0 percent while its share of imports rose from 
6.4 percent in 1854/6 to 9.9 percent in 1913.
16
 Looking more closely, we find that the 
share of British exports to Latin America taken by various countries changed 
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significantly between 1860 and 1913. Thus, while Chile’s share fell slightly from 12.1 
percent to 10.8 percent, and that of Brazil more significantly from 31.4 percent to 22.6 
percent, that of the Argentine Republic grew dramatically, from 12.9 percent to 40.8 
percent.
17
 It has been suggested that “trade inevitably followed capital flows, with 
British exports to each country closely correlated to the extent of British 
investment.”18 Thus, the growth of British exports to the Argentine Republic was a 
reflection of Britain’s financial investment in the country, especially the railways, 
which made possible the rapid expansion of agricultural output and increased exports 
to Europe and North America.  
 Key to such developments were two technological innovations of the period, 
namely the transatlantic steamship and the railway, both of which made importing and 
exporting to and from the region less burdensome.
19
 The penetration by railways of 
the interior of countries such as Brazil and Argentina, especially the latter, enabled the 
development of modern, steam-powered domestic textile and milling industries, by 
bringing the supplies of coal needed to power the new factories and mills.
20
 As well as 
providing the means by which steam power could be distributed more widely, 
railways themselves required coal for their daily operations. Coal, therefore, was 
fundamental to economic growth in South America between 1850 and 1913, despite 
the emergence in some countries towards the end of the study period of hydro-electric 
power schemes and the exploitation of local oil resources. 
 
Coal and economic development in South America, 1850–1913 
Nineteenth century economic development was predicated on power, and while wind 
or water could be harnessed for some purposes, it was steam power that proved the 
most significant. While peat and wood could be used as fuels in certain circumstances, 
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coal was the most suitable for generating steam. Most South American countries, 
however, lacked an indigenous supply of suitable quality coal. It was only really in 
Chile that sizeable amounts of coal were produced on an annual basis, and even here 
levels of production paled into insignificance with those in countries in Europe and 
North America. From negligible beginnings in the 1840s, however, Chilean coal 
production had reached almost 900,000 tons by 1877, and by the end of the 1870s 
“coal mining in Chile was an important productive activity, not only in terms of its 
output, but also with regard to employment, technological innovation and its social 
effects.”21 Such development depended largely on domestic capital, only one English 
company, the Arauco Company, established in 1855, being formed to exploit Chilean 
coal.
22
  
 Data provided by Mitchell, indicates that while Chile was still the major 
producer in South America in the mid-1890s, production had fallen back to only 
200,000 metric tons in 1895, though it did enjoy an expansion thereafter to 1.28 
million metric tons in 1913.
23
 Of the other coal producers, Venezuela produced a 
mere 7,000 metric tons in 1913, and Peru 274,000 metric tons, while Argentina and 
Brazil produced nothing of any note. Indeed, the largest and fastest growing 
economies in South America after 1850 had virtually no meaningful domestic coal 
resources of their own and had to rely on imports. Throughout most of the study 
period the monopoly supplier of coal was Britain and, in particular, south Wales. It 
was not just Britain’s close trading relationship with South America that predicated 
this, but that Welsh coal had been widely proven to be of the best quality available. 
Somewhat ironically, while steam had largely replaced sail as the main delivery 
mechanism for higher value trade and ocean liners by the twentieth century, much of 
the coal exported to South America even in 1914 was brought in by sailing ship.
24
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While the exports of raw material and foodstuffs from the region to Europe and North 
America have been the focus of attention of most historians, an important aspect of 
this trade was the coal which travelled in the opposite direction. This back-freight 
helped lower inbound freight rates and hence the cost of living in the countries 
receiving South American produce.  
 British (Welsh) coal was therefore ubiquitous, underpinning the economic 
development of South America before 1914. Not only did it help to open up the 
interiors of countries by enabling the spread of railways, it facilitated the export trade 
by lowering transport costs, both domestically and externally. But, as in other parts of 
the world, this trade, and the ships engaged in it, had to be protected. Welsh steam 
coal also played a fundamental role in the protection of trade in the South Atlantic, 
and to British control of the shipping lanes. The Royal Navy, crucial to Britain’s 
oceanic hegemony, had gradually introduced steam warships from the 1820s and by 
the 1870s it was almost fully reliant on them, and therefore the availability of quality 
coal to perform these roles. Through helping to power Britain’s “ubiquitous navy,”25 
coal facilitated the navy’s role in holding together the fabric of empire. Indeed, the 
empire has been described as “an almost invisible web of connecting forces and 
influences, of which the Royal Navy was one of the most important.”26 While the 
limits on British power in Latin America have been described recently as “real and 
palpable” and Royal Navy blockades as “always a rather blunt instrument here,”27 it 
has nevertheless been suggested that what power it had “revolved around naval bases 
and coaling stations, such as the Falklands/Malvinas, which became what Lord 
Curzon referred to as the ‘tollgates and barbicans’ of empire.”28 However, the number 
of Admiralty coaling stations in the South Atlantic was limited, and much reliance 
was placed by the Royal Navy on commercial coaling stations for their supplies. 
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Hence Britain’s commercial trading activities in coal, in a number of different ways, 
played a key role in underpinning Britain’s informal empire in South America.  
 The nature of British coal exports to South America will now be examined, 
followed by a consideration of the role of the network of ports and coaling stations 
which made this trade and its protection by the Royal Navy possible. 
 
British coal exports, 1850–191329 
With domestic supplies of coal falling well short of what was required to fuel 
economic development and the growth of urban centres, most South American 
economies, with the possible exception of Chile, were reliant on imported coal to 
meet their power needs.
30
 Coal was needed to fuel the locomotives on the expanding 
railway network, to provide steam power to industry and to the steamships engaged in 
coastal and overseas trade. As with supplies for domestic use, the coal required for 
bunkering ships also had to be imported, but where did it come from?  
 In his statistical study of the “growth, character, and direction of our foreign 
trade in coal during the second half of the nineteenth century,” the Welsh coalowner 
and Member of Parliament, David Alfred Thomas, identified the growing importance 
towards the end of the nineteenth century of south Wales coal exports as compared to 
those from the ports of the Tyne in most overseas markets, though the degree to which 
this was so depended on geography. Moreover, he concluded that:
 
 
 
any considerable increase in our [coal] exports in the future will probably be 
confined to the European and Mediterranean markets, and markets on the East 
Coast of South America and West Coast of Africa.
 31
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While data limitations make it difficult to be precise about the origins of British coal 
exports to South America prior to 1896, comments made in British consular and 
diplomatic reports provide further insights, not only into the source of British coal 
exports to specific destinations in South America but also the amount of competition 
faced there by British producers. 
 These reports, from consuls located across the continent, indicate that British 
coal held a virtual monopoly of the coal trade with South America, especially to ports 
along the east coast. Moreover, the British coal trade was dominated by ships 
departing the ports of the Bristol Channel carrying Welsh coal, in particular steam 
coal from the port of Cardiff. Thus an analysis of coal imports at Rio de Janeiro in 
1894 indicates that 78 percent of the British coal (which accounted for 94.6 percent of 
total coal imports) came from south Wales (91.2 percent of this from Cardiff).
32
 From 
1896, annual data on British exports to various countries allows us to be more precise, 
indicating that 80 percent of British coal exports to South America between 1896 and 
1913 originated from the Bristol Channel ports.
33
 Moreover, between 1896 and 1913, 
the proportion emanating from this group of ports rose from 76.75 percent to 84.75 
percent, while that from the North-Eastern ports fell from 10.54 percent to below 5 
percent.
34
  
 Why did south Wales steam coal dominate the coal trade with South America? 
There are three inter-related factors which explain this dominance: the cost per unit of 
evaporative power of Welsh coal; the distance between south Wales and South 
America; and the requirements of the Royal Navy. Steam coal from the central 
portion of the south Wales coalfield, which was served in the main by the port of 
Cardiff, was widely recognised as the source of the best quality steam coals in the 
world, especially by the world’s navies.35 While other types of coal were shipped to 
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South America, including anthracite from the western part of the south Wales 
coalfield, it was the steam coals which dominated the trade. Thus, by 1911, three-
quarters of the coal shipped from the ports of south Wales was of this type, including 
the dry, smokeless steam coals of the central region of the south Wales coalfield 
which were particularly suited to naval purposes. While not all customers had such 
demanding requirements as the Royal Navy, the marketing advantage provided to 
south Wales producers by the Admiralty’s decision to purchase only the best steam 
coals from the region, following a series of Admiralty trials from the 1840s through to 
the 1870s, played a significant role.
36
 Having, as a result, gained virtually a monopoly 
of supplies to the Admiralty by the end of the 1880s, south Wales producers of the 
best steam coals, i.e. those on the Admiralty List, had a very strong marketing 
advantage over competitors.  
 For the world’s navies, Welsh steam coal had two major advantages over its 
competitors: the lack of smoke produced and the amount of evaporative power 
provided per ton of coal. For commercial customers, it was the cost per unit of 
evaporative power of a type of coal that was the determining factor. In South America, 
the cost per ton of American coal could occasionally be slightly less than that of 
Welsh coal, but its inferiority in steam-raising ability proved crucial. One Brazilian 
railway company which trialled American coal found, for example, that despite an 
initial lower cost per ton it had a greater cost per unit of evaporative power, since 
consumption was 12.5 percent greater than with Welsh coal.
37
 
 From the perspective of the South American trade, not only did south Wales 
produce the best quality steam coal in the world, but the ports of the Bristol Channel 
which served the coalfield were closer than those which served other major British 
coalfields. Thus, Buenos Aires, for example, was 6,116 nautical miles from Cardiff 
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but 6,498 from Newcastle-upon-Tyne (for the distances to other South American ports 
from Cardiff see the Appendix). Shorter distances meant faster sailing times, but they 
did not necessarily imply a cheaper freight rate, shipping records revealing no simple 
link between the two.
38
 Prior to the commencement of wheat exports around 1890, 
coal exports to South America “had to pay a significant portion of the round trip cost” 
but, thereafter, “wheat exports assumed much of the joint cost,” as did subsequently 
exports of cattle and meat.
39
  
 Falling freight rates in the latter decades of the study period fuelled the 
expansion of coal exports. From relatively small beginnings in the 1850s,
40
 annual 
British coal exports to South America finally exceeded a million tons in the early 
1880s, having all but reached this total in 1874 (see Figure 1). The 2 million ton 
figure was breached for the first time in 1889, but it was not until five years later that 
exports regularly exceeded this figure. Having reached the three million ton mark in 
1904, exports more than doubled within the next decade, falling just 42,000 tons short 
of the 7 million ton mark in 1913. As Figure 1 shows, throughout most of the post-
1850 period, it was the countries on the eastern seaboard of South America, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Argentina, which collectively took the vast bulk of these exports.
41
  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Against the background of this increase, the experience of the three countries during 
the study period was quite different. The share taken by Uruguay varied in the main 
between 10 percent and 20 percent, while Brazil saw its share fall from over one-half 
in the 1850s to just a quarter in 1913 (see Figure 2). By contrast, Argentina’s share 
rose from negligible proportions in 1850, and just 10 percent in the early 1880s, to 
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over 50 percent by 1913. Thus, in 1913, of the 7 million tons of British coal shipped 
to South America, 3.7 million tons went to Argentina alone; 5.9 million tons of the 
South American total was shipped from Bristol Channel ports, 3.2 million tons 
destined for Argentina. These developments reflected the much more rapid growth of 
Argentina over the study period, as indicated by gross domestic product per capita 
figures which trebled between 1870 and 1913 from 1,311 to 3,797 US dollars, while 
that of Brazil grew only from 713 to 811 US dollars over the same period.
42
 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
But for what purposes was the imported coal used? In Brazil, one diplomatic and 
consular report indicates that, in the early 1900s, 75 percent of the coal imported at 
Rio de Janeiro was used for steam purposes (railways, steamships, etc.), 15 percent 
was gas coal and 10 percent was used for domestic (household) purposes. 
Furthermore, “Of the steam coal imported it is estimated that 10 percent is reshipped 
for bunkers of British vessels.”43 Within Brazil, the largest customer, the Central 
Railway, was supplied with 120,000 tons in 1900 by a British firm which undertook 
to supply Admiralty List coals.
44
 In Argentina, “The Buenos Ayres and Rosario, 
Buenos Ayres Great Southern, and the Central Argentina Railway contracts regularly 
went to suppliers of South Wales steam coal.”45 The rapid development of the 
Argentinian railways, and the industrial development associated with the opening up 
of the Pampas undoubtedly explain some of the rapid growth in coal exports to 
Argentina in the 1900s. Nevertheless, of the 3.8 million tons of coal imported into 
Argentina in 1913, virtually all of it from Britain, it is impossible to know exactly 
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how much was used domestically, and how much of it represented bunker fuel used to 
refuel visiting steamships.
46
 
  Despite our lack of knowledge of the size of the bunker trade, how did Welsh 
bunker coal get to South America and how was it distributed?  
 
From sail to steam 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the vast bulk of British trade with South 
America was conducted in sailing ships. While the Royal Mail Steam Packet Line 
commenced services to Brazil in 1851, longer routes were generally uneconomic for 
early steamships. Hence the vast trade in copper ore between Swansea and Chile, 
which peaked in the 1860s,
47
 was conducted entirely by sailing barques specially 
constructed for sailing around Cape Horn. Such barques, on their outward journal 
from south Wales, often carried coal destined for ports in South America. Some of 
this, of course, was destined for railway use and some to provide power for the 
nascent industries of the period. The amount used as bunker fuel would have been 
tiny given the relatively small number of steamships within and visiting the region in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, but it undoubtedly grew as the nineteenth 
century wore on, even though sailing ships continued to be more economic on some 
trading routes in the region. Indeed, routes such as those round Cape Horn continued 
to be plied by sailing barques as late as the third decade of the twentieth century 
despite the fact that steamships had begun to enter the coal trade between south Wales 
and South America before the outbreak of the First World War. 
 Thus, Thomas’s claim in 1903 that “The substitution of steam for sail is well-
nigh complete” or, more recently, that of Pascali that sailing boats only ceased to be 
used on a large scale in international trade around 1910, do not adequately 
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characterise the coal trade between south Wales and South America at the end of our 
study period.
48
 Nevertheless, technological changes in ship construction and engine 
design were significant factors in the switch from sail to steam in ocean-going 
shipping in the second half of the nineteenth century. By the 1860s, the development 
of high pressure boilers enabled the benefits of compound engines to be fully realised, 
such that in 1869, “the tonnage of British steam vessels engaged in international trade 
cleared in English ports surpassed that of British sailing vessels for the first time.”49  
 Steamships, unlike sailing ships, were not at the mercy of the wind, enabling 
them to use shorter routes and reduce journey times. To operate effectively, however, 
steamships required an infrastructure or network of coaling stations at which they 
could refuel. The smaller the number of such stations, and the greater the distance 
between them, the larger the amount of coal a ship would need to carry for its own 
purposes, consequently reducing the income-earning cargo it could carry. While 
improvements in steam engine design led to greater fuel efficiency over time, the 
existence of coaling stations played a major role in determining the distances which 
steamships could travel, and the routes they could ply. While the importance of 
coaling stations has often been referred to in the historical literature, not only of the 
British coal trade but also that of specific locations, the number of detailed studies 
thereof in the English language is relatively small. Certain Atlantic ports and coaling 
stations have received recent attention, especially those on the Macronesian islands, in 
particular Cape Verde and the Canary Islands.
50
 The emergence of Santos as a coffee 
port during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has also been examined, 
but otherwise the coaling activities of South America ports have been largely 
ignored.
51
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 On the South American mainland, port and coaling facilities developed slowly 
at first. Many of the primitive harbours used by sailing barques to load copper ore in 
Chile, for example, were unsuitable for steamships, lacking adequate bunkering 
facilities, with only poor quality local coals available and “turn-around times [which 
were] far too slow to make steamships economic.”52 The provision of suitable 
bunkering facilities was gradually achieved through a mix of harbour improvements 
and the establishment of specialised coaling stations, the size of this network 
increasing with the growth in the number of steamships.  
 
The growth of harbour facilities 
While smaller steamships may have been able to refuel at lesser ports and small 
natural harbours, the vast majority of large ones, especially those belonging to major 
shipping lines, would have collected their coal supplies when calling at the major 
ports due to their superior infrastructure. The amount of coal needed by such ships 
would depend on their size, the distance to be travelled and the precise routes taken 
(in particular, where the next possible coaling point might be). The choice of where to 
refuel could, however, be influenced greatly by the facilities available and the cost of 
taking on coal at individual ports.
53
 The decision of ship’s captains on where to refuel 
depended heavily on the port charges and whether or not the coal imported for 
bunkering purposes had to incur any duty.  
 In 1911, Welsh coal was taken to 21 destinations in South America.
54
 The 
amounts ranged from 1.83 million tons unloaded at Buenos Aires through 0.75 
million tons at Montevideo and 0.74 million tons at Rio de Janeiro, to 0.33 million 
tons at Bahia Blanca, 0.25 million tons at Rosario, and 0.18 million tons at Santos. 
Minor destinations, such as South Georgia and the Falklands, failed to take any coal 
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in 1911, though they usually took small amounts each year. Since we do not have the 
space to examine developments at all locations, we will confine ourselves to a brief 
overview of developments at the two most important and sometimes rival locations, 
the Rio de la Plata and Rio de Janeiro, focusing on the competitive nature of the 
bunker fuel trade. 
 
The coal trade of the Rio de la Plata 
In the mid-1880s, Montevideo could be referred to as the “first harbour on the 
southern half of the South American east coast,” but at a time when sailing ships still 
dominated trade with South America its harbour was only usable for two-thirds of the 
year, due to the southerly winds which affected it between May and August.
 55
 While 
breakwaters were constructed to enable the harbour to be used all year round, 
Montevideo nevertheless faced increasing competition from the development of port 
facilities on the southern side of the Rio de la Plata estuary, at Buenos Aires and La 
Plata. The idea of constructing a port at Buenos Aires was first put forward in 1882, 
with work commencing in 1887 and being completed in 1897, when it was reported 
that the “improved dock accommodation here [Buenos Aires] and at La Plata enables 
steamers to take in bunker coals very rapidly and in large quantities, which formerly 
would have been shipped on board at Montevideo or other ports of call on the voyage 
to Europe.”56 From this time onwards, competition for refuelling ships became 
significant in the Rio de la Plata. 
 In the early twentieth century it was noted that steamers calling only to take on 
coal at La Plata would no longer have to pay entrance and dock dues according to 
their tonnage but only according to the quantity of coal taken (minimum of 100 
tons).
57
 This, together with its location closer to the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, 
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meant that La Plata derived “some slight benefit from the entrance of steamers which 
call to coal only.”58 Three years later it was noted that the port had been acquired by 
the Federal Government and, since it was now considered to form part of the port of 
Buenos Aires, “vessels having paid entry dues at either do not have to pay again on 
entering the other.”59 Moreover, it was also noted that, at this time, coal to the 
Argentine Republic was imported free of duty.
60
 Such factors clearly impacted on 
coaling activities at Montevideo where, in 1907, the 20 percent reduction in the 
number of British ships calling there was put down to two factors: first, an increase in 
the average carrying capacity of each ship; and second, the fact that it was cheaper to 
coal at Buenos Aires.
61
 The British consul cited the heavy lighterage dues rigidly 
enforced at Montevideo as part of the explanation for this, noting in his report for 
1908 that they had been reduced by more than 50 percent, while the duty of 4 
shillings per ton on coal was now remitted on all coal used for bunkering.
62
  
 The collective impact of these various developments on the coal trade of 
Montevideo in the early twentieth century was that imports of coal for domestic 
consumption within Uruguay increased more rapidly than coal used as bunkers. In 
1901, of the 300,000 tons of coal imported into Montevideo, about two-thirds was 
used as bunkers, and just one-third domestically.
63
 By 1910–11 the relative proportion 
had fallen to 1.36:1.
64
 In addition, coal was imported for domestic use, particularly by 
the Uruguayan railways which, it was noted, “import coal on their own account.”65 
 
Rio de Janeiro 
In the early 1890s it was recorded that “homeward bound steamers of the Shaw Savill 
and New Zealand Shipping Companies call at Rio once a month each to coal” as well 
as bringing various supplies.
66
 Nevertheless, refuelling at Rio was negatively affected 
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by the lack of facilities and the high duty (c.2 shillings per ton) imposed on coal 
imports at this time, causing ships to refuel at Montevideo, where it was duty free.
67
 
Although over time the facilities improved, problems of heavy charges still remained. 
Thus a decade later it was noted that, although coal had by this time become 
nominally free of duty, “the charges levied on it in Brazilian ports are in fact very 
heavy,” amounting to approximately 4 shillings per metric ton.68 Local regulations 
were also viewed unfavourably: 
 
 Foreign steamers calling at Rio de Janeiro merely in order to take in coal or 
provisions must comply with all the ordinary formalities of entry and 
clearance before they can sail. The working hours of the custom-house are 
from 10 A.M. to 3 P.M., and a steamer putting in for bunkers runs the risk of 
being detained until the following day, and on Saturdays or on the eve of a 
holiday the detention may be even more serious.
69
 
 
Heavy port charges at Rio also had a negative effect, although by 1908 “a law is now 
enforced under which steamers entering solely for supplies and not working cargo are 
freed from all further expenses on payment of 2l. [i.e. 2 pounds sterling].”70 A few 
years later, a reduction in port dues and in freight rates were cited as explanations for 
the marked increase in the amount of British shipping calling in at Rio, especially to 
refuel.
71
 The impact of the variability in freight rates and competition among coaling 
firms at this time was indicated clearly: 
 
 keen competition among some of the coaling firms [in early 1912] led to a 
considerable cutting in prices, with the result that ships could coal here much 
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more cheaply than in the River Plate. Freights rose again at the end of 1912, 
and if their present rate continues some of these ships may in future put into 
the River Plate again for their coal, instead of here.
72
 
 
The development of coal agencies and coaling depots 
In order for ships to refuel in foreign ports, two things were necessary: infrastructure 
arrangements to facilitate refuelling, and supplies of coal. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, such arrangements were organised by general merchants, such as E. Johnston 
& Co. and Nathan Brothers, and/or specialist coal and steamship agents, such as 
Wilson, Sons & Co., established in 1837.
73
 Wilsons subsequently became the Bahia 
agents of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. following that company’s commencement 
of services to Brazil in 1851, and was subsequently joined by other specialist coal 
agencies as the century progressed.
74
 Foremost amongst these was Cory Brothers, 
which began to set up agencies and subsidiaries across the continent in the late 
nineteenth century, having initially focused its operations in the Mediterranean.
75
 
 Agencies were generally responsible for organising shipments for domestic 
customers and, in the case of shipping lines, making sure that coal was available for 
their ships to-refuel on arrival when required. Thus, Wilsons claimed in 1906 that 
amongst their regular contractors were “all leading steamship lines,” another source 
specifically citing the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, and the British-owned 
Western Telegraph Company.
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 As the extent of steam shipping increased and the 
demand for bunker fuel rose, some of the larger agencies, rather than simply 
arranging cargoes for individual customers, began to establish their own coal depots 
at which coal could be deposited, and from which customers, including casual ones, 
could be supplied as and when they called. Such activity involved a greater financial 
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investment than that required for a simple agency office, and was carried out mainly 
by the more well-established coal agents and at those destinations with the heaviest 
trade and best harbour facilities. 
 Thus, when Wilsons became a limited liability company in 1877 it had 
“Warehouses and local managers […] located in Recife, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, 
Santos, Sao Paulo, as well as the Canary Islands, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires.”77 
In the mid-1890s it was reported that the completion by Wilsons of a large coal depot 
at Bahia, comprising six sheds capable of holding 10,000 tons, would be a massive 
improvement on the “somewhat primitive” arrangements currently existing there.78 
By 1906 Wilsons had storage facilities for 30,000 tons of coal on one of the islands in 
the bay of Guanabara, near Rio de Janeiro. Despite being smaller, having just two 
depots in 1913 at Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, with another being 
constructed at Buenos Aires, Amaral, Sutherland & Co. Ltd. was nevertheless able to 
trade coal throughout the continent via its network of agents at Manaos, Maranham, 
Campana, Parangua, Desterro, Salto, Rosario, Santa Fé and Chilean ports.
79
 Through 
this network it supplied South American railways and steamship companies, including 
the Lloyd Brazileiro, while Mann, George & Co. acted as the River Plate agents for 
three shipping lines: the New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd., Shaw, Savill & Albion Co. 
Ltd. and The White Star Line.
80
 Such customers often required the best, if not the very 
best, qualities of coal available, and the coal agencies were capable of supplying this.  
 One reason for this is the links which coal agents had with particular colliery 
companies, their offices in the major Welsh ports (and elsewhere across Britain) 
enabling them to keep in close, rapid telegraphic contact with both their suppliers and 
their customers through their offices and depots overseas.
81
 Many coal agents, like 
Wilsons, started out as independent middlemen, engaged in arranging the shipping of 
21 
 
coal from the supplier to the customer. This continued to be the situation for many 
concerns as late as 1914, despite the precarious position in which it potentially placed 
them. Thus, Moxey, Savon & Company, which only commenced operations in the 
Suez region in the early 1890s, was able to expand its activities, despite its 
independence, to South America by 1914.
82
 However, the changing economics of the 
Welsh coal industry were beginning to impress themselves on the nature of the 
relationship between coal agents and colliery companies. Major coal producers, such 
as the Ocean Coal Company and the Powell Dufrryn Steam Coal Company, were 
increasingly concerned with ensuring the markets for their output, in order to ensure 
regular and efficient working of their pits. While the incentives from both sides of the 
coal trade to secure long-term, contractual relationships were always strong, they 
tended to increase with the passage of time and an increase in competitive pressures. 
Thus, in 1908, the Ocean Coal Company, south Wales’ second largest colliery 
concern by 1913, merged with Wilsons to form Ocean Coal and Wilsons Ltd.
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Although Ocean had been a long-term major supplier to Wilsons, it was considered 
that a formal merger was in the best interests of both concerns. The Ocean company’s 
main rival and largest coal company in south Wales on the eve of the First World War, 
the Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. Ltd., found it more difficult to secure such an 
arrangement, only in 1928 was the company finally able to effect a merger with a 
major shipping and coal agency business, Stephenson Clarke & Associated 
Companies, though there had been a close working relationship between the two 
concerns for many years. 
 Another main player in the coal industry which emerged in south Wales in the 
run up to the First World War was the Cambrian combine, a web of colliery 
companies and sales agencies which all came under the ownership and control of 
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David Alfred Thomas (later Lord Rhondda) and a small number of colleagues. Thus, 
Thomas & Davey acted as coal agents for the Cambrian colliery, Lysberg Ltd., 
“which was to become one of the most important ship-owning, coal exporting and 
pitwood-importing undertakings in South Wales,” became sales agent to the 
Glamorgan colliery, and L. Gueret Ltd. for the Naval colliery.
84
 An off-shoot of the 
last of these was Gueret’s Anglo-Brazilian Coaling Co. Ltd. whose remit was to 
expand trade with South America.
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 One notable exception to the pattern of links indicated above was Cory 
Brothers and Company. After 1849, when Richard Cory’s two sons joined him, his 
ship’s chandlery and general merchanting business in Cardiff expanded into ship-
broking, insurance-broking and coal exporting.
86
 The business acquired its own ships 
in the 1860s, while towards the end of the decade strategic decisions were made to 
move into colliery ownership and to establish a network of coaling stations along the 
world’s major shipping routes. In 1906, Cory Brothers had 78 depots located around 
the world, 11 of which were in South America: Bahia, Bahia Blanca, Buenos Aires, 
La Plata, Montevideo, Para, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Rosario 
and Santos.
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 On the eve of the First World War, the company, which produced just 
under 1.9 million tons of coal, making it the sixth largest producer in the south Wales 
coalfield,
 
has been described by Yeo as “the largest coal-owning and exporting 
concern in South Wales.”88 
 Thus, by the end of our study period, Ocean Coal & Wilsons, Cory Brothers 
and the Cambrian combine, were integrated coal producers and coal agents, the last 
two also owning their own ships. Their activities, and those of other coal agencies 
which had depots and coaling stations in South America, as was clearly indicated by 
their adverts in the trade press, were able to supply not just Welsh coal, but the best 
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Admiralty List coals, i.e. those Welsh coals which were considered suitable for use by 
the ships of the Royal Navy. This ability helped to under-write the security of British 
trade with South America. 
 
The Royal Navy and coal supplies in South America 
British trade routes, whether with the formal or informal empire, needed protecting, 
though not all to the same extent. Whereas the formal empire was the focus of heavy 
protection, and the Mediterranean and China stations were considered, outside of 
home waters, to be the areas in need of most naval presence, the trade routes to South 
America were not left unprotected. However, since the South Atlantic, like the Pacific, 
was not the most important area for the navy to protect, hybrid steam and sail ships 
continued to provide some of the Royal Navy’s presence there even into the early 
twentieth century. While it was the adoption of the triple expansion engine in the 
1880s, which finally enabled steam to fulfil its worldwide role, this progress was 
something of a two-edged sword.
89
 On the one hand it provided the Royal Navy with 
an enhanced source of naval power, but on the other it made it easier for Britain’s 
naval rivals to attack trade on a near global scale.  
 Despite being of less strategic importance than other oceanic spaces, control of 
the sea lanes of the South Atlantic was key to protecting the trade of the informal 
empire, as well as for relations with the South American countries themselves. In this 
respect, many of the most significant ties were intrinsically linked to the Royal Navy, 
which had a long and important connection with many of their navies.
90
 The South 
Atlantic was also part of key routes to places beyond its boundaries. Indeed, until the 
Panama Canal was opened (in 1914), it was immensely important for controlling the 
Pacific and, in turn, for keeping in check the naval ambitions of the USA and France, 
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especially once ships’ ranges increased. Since the Royal Navy remained 
predominantly coal powered into the First World War, to control the South Atlantic, 
and indeed just to pass through it, the navy needed to have a secure and reliable 
source of quality coal.
 91
  
 The establishment of naval coaling stations at strategic points around the 
world was therefore vital to the protection of British trading routes by the Royal Navy, 
although sole reliance on such stations presented it with serious difficulties.
92
 The 
costs of establishing a station, and of maintaining coal stocks were not inconsiderable, 
though these could vary with their size and significance. However, due in part to the 
changing nature of the navy’s ships and the ever-changing geopolitical situation, the 
relevance of specific naval coaling stations could, and did, differ, both at specific 
points in time and over time. Changes in the threat posed by other nations to British 
interests, both real and potential, in particular played a key role in the classification 
afforded to the different stations. In other oceans, the Admiralty had whole chains of 
naval stations which provided coal to the fleet, but in the South Atlantic the navy had 
few official coaling stations. Depending on how one divides the oceans, the main 
stations were St Helena, Ascension Island, the Falklands, Cape Coast Castle, 
Fernando Po and the Cape. Of these, only Simon’s Town, at the Cape of Good Hope, 
is ever considered to have been a first class coaling station. Of the others, only St 
Helena, Ascension Island, and the Falklands were of any note, with Ascension Island 
losing its importance after the 1870s and the Falklands only gaining any significance 
in the early twentieth century.
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 It is important to note that there were huge distances 
between these stations, and even ships of the early twentieth century could not reach 
the Falklands, the only British station in the environs of South America, without 
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coaling en route from Europe, as it was some 3,000 miles beyond their range. The 
nearest station in the other direction, Vancouver in the Pacific, was even further away.  
 In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Royal Navy vessels obtained 
coal from various Admiralty stores in South America, including Rio de Janeiro, 
Pernambuco, Bahia, Valparaiso and Callao, although ships’ captains and commanders 
often needed to make casual purchases from commercial agents where no naval stores 
existed.
94
 The amounts shipped out to these naval stores were small, that to Rio de 
Janeiro, the most widely used, averaging just 1,665 tons per annum for the four-year 
period 1856–59.95 By 1869, in addition to locations already mentioned, HM ships 
were taking on board coal at Montevideo and the Falklands, though the amount at the 
latter for the first half of 1869 was just 169 tons.
96
 The largest amount taken on board 
from South American stores by a single ship during the first half of 1869 was 571.5 
tons by the HMS Oberon, in addition to the 257.35 tons it took on board at St. 
Vincent, Tenerife and Madeira.
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 Even at this early date, all but a tiny fraction of the 
3,368.1 tons of coal used by HM ships in the first half of 1869 was Welsh. 
 The nature of the stores at which coal was loaded is not entirely clear, being 
described in some returns as naval establishments or depots, with other returns 
indicating that the coal was loaded at the contractor’s yard. In all likelihood, these 
were merely stocks held by commercial coaling stations for naval use. This is 
suggested again by the fact that navy estimates for 1870–71 fail to indicate the 
existence of any coal depots or dockyards in South America, although a return of coal 
stocks at “home and foreign stations” for 1869–71 mentions Valparaiso.98 Subsequent 
returns of proposed expenditure at naval dockyards at home and abroad contained in 
the navy estimates for the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s fail to make any mention of a 
dockyard or coaling station in South America. It is in the navy estimates for 1900–01 
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that the Falklands is mentioned for the first time, despite the fact that the territory had 
been under the control of successive Naval Officers in Charge during the early period 
of British re-occupation from 1833.
99
 In the early 1840s a dozen Royal marines were 
garrisoned on the Falklands when settlement was shifted to what became Port Stanley, 
with its natural harbour.
100
 Discussions over whether the Falklands should become a 
major naval station never seem to have got far, although in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century it did become an important centre for provisioning and repairing 
ships sailing round Cape Horn, including British naval vessels.
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 Due to their remoteness and isolation from outside threats, the Falklands were 
never considered to be of much importance by the Admiralty during the era in which 
sail continued to dominate in the South Atlantic and it would appear that the naval 
facility there was allowed to diminish. In their third and final report, published on 22 
July 1882, Lord Carnarvon’s Royal Commission on Colonial Defence declared that 
the Falklands would “at no remote period, cease to be of military importance” due to 
the fact that “Much of the British trade which passes round Cape Horn, or through the 
Straits of Magellan, will be diverted to the Panámá route when the Panámá Canal is 
completed.”102 However, problems in constructing the canal meant, paradoxically, 
that the Falklands became more, rather than less, important as naval ships in the South 
Atlantic began increasingly to switch to steam. At the beginning of the 1890s, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord G. Hamilton, noted in a debate in parliament that 
“we shall shortly have to establish a new station in the South Pacific, probably the 
Falkland Islands, and we shall make an experiment there on a small scale,” going on 
to note that it would be garrisoned by marines and if the experiment proved successful, 
it would likely be extended to the China stations.
103
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 There were, however, no immediate moves towards developing a naval 
coaling station on the Falklands until the late 1890s, and then seemingly in a 
somewhat unplanned manner. In his report for 1895, the consul emphasised the 
favourable position of the islands as a “rendezvous for both Atlantic and Pacific 
stations,” and reflected on the fact that during the year the Admiralty had acquired a 
rifle range for use of HM ships.
104
 In October 1896, the Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty requested special permission from the Treasury to make unplanned 
expenditure on sending a Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis from the Royal Engineers and an 
assistant to the Falklands to investigate the possibility of establishing a naval depot 
there, a matter which was “becoming more urgent.”105 With the financial collapse of 
the French company constructing the Panama Canal in 1899, the establishment of a 
coaling station on the Falklands gained vital momentum, with work commencing in 
1900.
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 After a total expenditure of £45,010/6/9d, work on the depot ceased during 
1904–05.107 
 Despite the absence of other British naval stations or coaling depots in the 
South Atlantic or South America, the use made of the Falklands depot seems to have 
been somewhat limited, judging from the amount of coal sent there annually from 
Britain and the limited number of visits recorded in the consular reports by HM ships. 
Although visits by ships of the Royal Navy’s South-east Coast of South America 
squadron to the Falklands became more frequent following the construction of the 
naval coaling depot in the early 1900s, they were still few in number and often short-
lived.
108
 During the middle of the decade, consular reports fail to mention any such 
visits, but in 1908 it was noted that HMS Sappho had “paid a short visit to the Colony 
in February.”109 In 1910, the 3,000 ton Topaz class cruiser HMS Amethyst stayed 
from 26 January to 5 February, and engaged in a field-day, with “the blue jackets and 
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marines being the attacking force and the [local, island] volunteers in the 
defensive.”110 The relatively small number of visits made by ships of the Royal Navy 
would suggest that the Falklands was not a major coaling station for naval vessels 
during the decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War though, 
paradoxically, it was to play an important strategic role once hostilities had 
commenced. In 1914, “Port Stanley was visited by thirteen warships,” a fact that 
reflects the surprise defeat suffered by the British navy at Coronel, off the coast of 
Valparaiso, on 1 November 1914.
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 The German fleet, commanded by von Spee, 
having achieved its victory, was advised to return home if it could, a difficult task 
since it would need to fully refuel at least once en route and Britain largely controlled 
all the coal north of the Falklands. With British-friendly ports refusing to supply them, 
the German fleet had to resort to capturing British colliers to obtain fuel and, in order 
to preserve fuel, was reduced to steaming at low speed, making it an easy target for a 
well-supplied British navy. In these circumstances, von Spee decided to raid the 
Falklands to obtain coal and destroy the facilities, preventing their subsequent use by 
the British navy. His actions were opposed by most of his captains and have been 
deemed unnecessary by some historians, but with little chance of making it home 
anyway, it could be seen as a last act of sabotage, or allowing the fleet more time to 
source coal to complete their journey.  
 The decision to raid the naval depot at the Falklands on 8 December 1914 
ended in disaster for the Germans since, unbeknown to von Spee, a larger British 
squadron had arrived there the day before. Despite being in the midst of coaling at the 
time German ships were first observed, the attack was repelled by the British 
squadron which subsequently chased down and sank the bulk of the German fleet. It 
has been argued that, as a result of the Battle of the Falklands, raids on commercial 
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shipping by ships of the regular German navy were brought to an end. The naval 
coaling depot on the Falklands had shown its importance and, together with the links 
Britain had with commercial coaling stations, indicates the power of Britain to deny 
enemy ships coal, even when caught unprepared.
112
  
 The relatively limited use made of the Falklands coal depot before the First 
World War might seem surprising given the existence of stations belonging to naval 
rivals such as Germany and France on the western seaboard of Africa. However, this 
fact can largely be explained by the Royal Navy’s ability to access Welsh coal via the 
naval stations of friendly powers such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and commercial 
coaling depots run by British companies such as those at Bahia (Abrolhos Rocks), Rio 
de la Plata (Buenos Aires and Montevideo) and Rio de Janeiro. British coal agents 
and depot owners operating in the region, such as Wilsons, acted not only as 
contractors for the Royal Navy, but also supplied “the navies of the United States, the 
Argentines, and Brazil,” while Amaral, Sutherland & Co. supplied the “friendly 
navies” of Brazil and Chile.113 Indeed, it has been claimed that “All South American 
navies took Welsh coal for steam navigation, but not in considerable quantities.”114  
 By accessing commercial depots in South America the Royal Navy was able 
to exert almost complete control of the South Atlantic in the study period, despite the 
limited number of British naval stations there. But key to its ability to use the 
commercial coaling stations was the availability of supplies of Welsh coal. This was 
crucial, the Admiralty stating in 1903 that, for the navy “irrespective of expense, 
[Britain] could not go below the minimum standard of requirements special to the 
Naval Service.”115 With the coal trade between Britain and South America dominated 
by Welsh steam coal, the Royal Navy was able to access the highest quality of coal it 
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required for its warships from the network of coaling stations established across the 
continent to satisfy commercial needs.
116
  
 Thus, Britain’s economic power in South America was especially important to 
the navy in the South Atlantic, as it allowed British warships to freely coal at the 
commercial stations located there, both in peace and war. Not only did this allow the 
Royal Navy the ability to function without founding major new naval stations, with all 
of the expense that that would have incurred, but also enabled Britain to put pressure 
on the ports at which these stations were located, especially in times of hostilities, to 
limit, or indeed cease, the supply of coal for foreign naval use. Such capabilities were 
central to the ability of Britain to retain commercial and political control of the South 
Atlantic and South American markets, reflecting the fundamental nature of Welsh 
coal to Britain’s informal empire in this region. Moreover, since all Royal Navy ships 
could benefit from these arrangements, the existence of the informal empire 
effectively reduced the military costs of the formal. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have argued that Welsh coal, and the network of coaling depots 
established throughout South America between 1850 and 1913 to distribute it played 
an important role in the relationship between the continent and Britain. Not only was 
Welsh coal a backhaul commodity that facilitated much of the industrialisation and 
modernisation in the region, it was also vital to Britain’s ability to control and protect 
its interests in South America. With economic development in the long nineteenth 
century based on the exploitation of steam power and most, if not all, countries in 
South America deficient in domestic supplies, their development relied on imports of 
steam coal. Most of this came from Britain and, more especially, the ports of the 
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Bristol Channel, which served the south Wales coalfield, the source of the best quality 
steam coal in the world. South Wales steam coal helped to power the railways which 
enabled expansion of the interiors of Brazil and Argentina especially, and also 
increasingly fed the steamships which brought the produce of these countries to 
Europe. To give effect to these developments, a network of commercial coaling 
depots had to be established throughout South America. With the only naval coaling 
depot in the South Atlantic being that on the Falklands, ships of the Royal Navy relied 
heavily on the naval stations of friendly navies in the region and/or on the commercial 
coaling stations for their supplies. These stations formed not only part of the network 
of trade with the region, but also played an important role in the protection of that 
trade and British interests generally, helping to maintain British political, economic, 
and cultural domination of the continent up to 1914. 
 Our findings suggest that the geographical network of trade routes in which 
Welsh coal was implicated played an important role in the context of informal empire. 
The port cities along the Atlantic seaboard where coaling stations were established 
were vital to the economic development of South America, as too were the railways 
which radiated therefrom and distributed the imported coal to the hinterland. Despite 
the undoubted importance of coal, the index of an important recent work on informal 
empire contains no entries for coal or steam, and only minor references to coal-related 
issues are to be found in the text.
117
 Furthermore, in the volume of the Oxford History 
of the British Empire covering the nineteenth century, there are more references to 
coconuts and coffee than to coal, which has only three mentions. We therefore 
conclude that given its importance to Britain’s trade with the continent, and in 
enabling the Royal Navy to protect this trade, Welsh coal needs to be re-integrated 
into, and given greater prominence within, studies of the informal empire. As the 
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Welsh Marxist historian, Gwyn Alf Williams put it, by the 1870s, Wales “nested at 
the heart of an imperial economy,” not least, due to the fact that “Welsh coal kept the 
Royal Navy afloat.”118 
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